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Abstract
Though some economic environments provide allocation rules that
are implementable in dominant strategies (strategy-proof), a signi-
cant number of environments yield impossibility results. On the other
hand, while there are quite general possibility results regarding imple-
mentation in Nash or Bayesian equilibrium, these equilibrium concepts
make strong assumptions about the knowledge that players possess, or
about the way they deal with uncertainty. As a compromise between
these two notions, we propose a solution concept built on one premise:
Players who do not have much to gain by manipulating an allocation
rule will not bother to manipulate it.
We search for ecient allocation rules for 2-agent exchange
economies that never provide players with large gains from cheating.
Though we show that such rules are very inequitable, we also show
that some such rules are signicantly more ﬂexible than those that
satisfy the stronger condition of strategy-proofness.
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JEL Classi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11 Introduction
In the eld of mechanism design, one of the most desirable incentives prop-
erties for a choice rule to possess is that of dominant strategy implementabil-
ity. For a planner attempting to implement a rule with this property, certain
issues|such as what information he has about the agents, what information
agents have about each other, and what information is revealed during in-
termediate stages of the execution of the mechanism|are irrelevant. These
issues are also irrelevant for a participating agent calculating an appropriate
(best) action to take. In fact, even the assumption that his fellow players
are rational need not be made by the player concerned with his own best
interests. Furthermore, calculating the appropriate action need not be more
complex for a player than the act of determining his own preferences over
outcomes.
Given the extreme desirability of this incentives property, it is an impor-
tant question to determine the situations for which rules exhibiting the prop-
erty exist. Indeed this question has been|and continues to be|answered for
an increasingly diverse class of situations. Interestingly, though, the nature
of the result depends strongly on the situation being described.
For example, the seminal works of Gibbard (1973) and Satterth-
waite (1975) provided an early negative result for the situation of voting:
no (non-dictatorial) voting rule satises even the slightly weaker condition of
strategy-proofness, requiring truth-telling to be a weakly dominant strategy
in the direct revelation mechanism. For the situation of choosing public al-
ternatives and taxation levels, the Vickrey{Clarke{Groves mechanisms have
been shown (by Green and Laont (1977), Holmstr¨ om (1979)) to be the only
ones satisfying strategy-proofness that choose ecient public alternatives.
Since these mechanisms are typically not budget balancing, this has been
seen as a negative result.1
In contrast, in certain \simpler" situations, positive results have prevailed.
Moulin (1980) describes the class of strategy-proof, onto voting rules for the
situation in which agents have \single-peaked" preferences over an ordering
1Interestingly, this class of mechanisms has a much better reputation in private goods
environments!
2of public alternatives, generalizing the classic median-voter rule (also, see
Ching (1997). For two classes of 2-sided matching problems (known as mar-
riage markets and college admissions problems), Alcald ea n dB a r b e r  a (1994)
provide a domain of preferences for which certain stable matching rules are
strategy-proof. In such problems, stability is arguably the most important
property for a rule to possess. For 1-sided matching problems|in particu-
lar, Shapley and Scarf's (1974) \housing market"|Roth (1982) shows that
the allocation rule central to the previous analysis of this domain|the Top
Trading Cycles algorithm|is strategy-proof. For situations in which agents
have single-peaked preferences over consumption of a single divisible private
good, Sprumont (1991) shows the strategy-proofness of the Uniform Rule,
which has subsequently been characterized in terms of many other desir-
able properties; see Ching (1992,1994), Schummer and Thomson (1997), and
Thomson (1994a,b,1995).
As the literature on strategy-proofness grows, our picture of the dividing
line between possibility and impossibility becomes clearer.2 This leaves us
with the need to address those situations in which no reasonable rules are
implementable in dominant strategies. There are various ways to do this.
One approach is to require a weaker form of implementation. This is
the approach taken in the large literature on Nash implementation (and its
renements), in which mechanisms have the property that their equilibrium
outcomes are ones that would have been chosen by some given choice rule.
For example, see Moore (1996). The results here tend to be more positive
than those in the strategy-proofness literature. However, these results come
with a price: Strong assumptions are made concerning the structure of in-
formation that agents possess (e.g., that players have common knowledge of
each other's preferences, or that they have common priors).
A second approach applies to situations in which the planner is satis-
ed with approximations; he may nd it sucient to implement a rule that
is \close" to some other desirable choice rule. One application of this ap-
proach can be seen in the literature on virtual implementation (Abreu and
Matsushima (1992), Duggan (1997)), in which the goal is to nd an imple-
2For a more detailed survey of the strategy-proofness literature, including more positive
results, see Thomson (1998).
3mentable mechanism whose equilibrium outcomes approximate the desired
outcomes.
Another application of the \approximation approach" is to measure, in
some way, the manipulability of a mechanism. In fact, there are various ways
of performing this analysis. Roberts and Postlewaite (1976) observe that as
the number of agents becomes large, the Walrasian allocation rule is asymp-
totically strategy-proof (also see C ordoba and Hammond (1998) and Ehlers
et al. (1999)). A similar analysis in an auction setting is performed by
Rustichini, Satterthwaite, and Williams (1994), who not only show an anal-
ogous asymptotic result for double auctions, but also argue that convergence
happens quickly as the number of agents increases.
Alternatively, Bevi a and Corch on (2) show that in a public goods setting,
any ecient and individually rational mechanism is manipulable on a dense
set of preference proles. Kelly (1993) and Smith (1999) suggest ways of
counting manipulable situations in a discrete voting environment.
Our Approach
The approach taken in this paper can be seen as a dierent type of contri-
bution to this approximation approach, involving an approximation to the
notion of a dominant strategy. The motivation behind our approximation
lies with a simple assumption about the strategic behavior of agents. Specif-
ically, we will approach the problem with the premise that if a player does
not have much to gain by manipulating an allocation rule, then he will not
bother to manipulate it.
This assumption can be interpreted (or applied) in various ways. For
example, it applies when agents have a relatively high cost of gathering in-
formation about each other. If such information is necessary for the player
to compute a protable way to manipulate the choice rule, it may not be
worth the expense to gather it. Similarly, another application of this idea is
to situations in which computation itself is costly to a player. Thirdly, for
situations in which agents value morality (or honesty) to some degree, the
small gains from cheating may not outweigh the losses (\guilt") incurred.
An important observation to make is that we make no assumption on the
4structure of information that agents possess.
The hypothesis of our premise is that \a player does not have much to
gain by manipulating." The critical detail of our work is to precisely dene
much. One approach is to use a utility-based approach to preferences. Using
this approach, a player would be assumed not to manipulate a rule unless his
utility gain would exceed a predetermined amount. This approach, however,
would depend heavily on the interpretation of utility and would imply certain
interpersonal comparisons.
To avoid this diculty, we use a dierent approach, which applies to
situations in which there exists a transferable, divisible, private good (e.g.,
money). With respect to such a good (which we call the numeraire good),
our behavioral assumption is that the only situations in which an agent will
manipulate a choice rule are when his gains are equivalent to receiving (at
least) a prespecied, additional amount (say, ) of the numeraire good. If
no such situation exists, we say that the choice rule provides truth-telling as
-dominant.
In this paper, we search for such rules on a simple class of economies: 2-
agent exchange economies with two goods. Furthermore, we restrict attention
to the domain of linearly additively separable preferences. Aside from the fact
that this is the rst work on this project, There is another reason we restrict
attention to such a simple class. It turns out that it is very straightforward to
measure the gains in possibility for this domain as the truth-telling condition
is relaxed (i.e., as  is increased), as we discuss below.
One of the earlier works on mechanism design is a paper by Hur-
wicz (1972), concerning 2-agent exchange economies with a more general
domain of preferences. He shows that it is impossible to construct a strategy-
proof, ecient rule that provides allocations which both agents prefer to their
original endowment. Zhou (1991) improves upon this result by showing that
if a rule is strategy-proof and ecient, then it is dictatorial: it must al-
ways give all of the goods to a prespecied agent. Finally, Schummer (1997)
strengthens these results by showing them to hold even on \small" domains
of preferences, including the linear preferences we use here.
Our results show that when strategy-proofness is weakened to the condi-
5tion that truth-telling be -dominant, a larger class of rules becomes admis-
sible. The result, however, has both a negative and a positive ﬂavor. First,
it must be the case that such a rule always allocates almost all of the nu-
meraire good to a prespecied agent. On the other hand, allocation of the
non-numeraire good may range from giving it all to one agent to giving it
all to the other agent. This ﬂexibility is in strong contrast to the negative
results with respect to strategy-proofness.
As a second positive interpretation of our results, we show that as the
truth-telling condition approaches strategy-proofness (i.e., as  converges to
zero), the set of ranges of the set of admissible rules does not converge to
the range of the only strategy-proof, ecient rules. That is, even if strategy-
proofness is relaxed an arbitrarily small amount, there is a (relatively) large
increase in the ﬂexibility of admissible rules.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the model. Sec-
tion 2.1 denes the truth-telling condition. Section 3 provides the rst result,
demonstrating a bound on the range of a rule. Section 4 describes the \least
dictatorial" rule satisfying our conditions. Section 8 concludes.
2M o d e l
The set of two agents is N = f1;2g.3 There is a positive endowment of
two innitely divisible goods Ω = (Ω1;Ω2) 2 R2
++. Each agent i 2 N is to
consume a bundle xi 2 R2






+ such that x1 + x2 = Ω. Subscripts refer to agents
and superscripts refer to goods. The set of allocations is denoted A.T h e
vector inequalities are <, ,a n d= .
Each agent has a strictly monotonic, linear preference relation, Ri,o v e r
his consumption space R2
+.4 Denote the set of such preference relations as R.
The strict (antisymmetric) preference relation and indierence (symmetric)
relation associated with Ri are denoted Pi and Ii.
An allocation rule is a function ':R2 ! A mapping the set of preference
3Notation primarily follows Schummer (1997).
4Such preference relations are the ones representable by a utility function of the form
u(xi)=ax1
i + bx2
i, a;b > 0.
6proles into the set of allocations. To simplify notation, when '(R)=x ,w e
denote 'i(R)=x ifor any agent i 2 N. Furthermore, we write −i to refer to
the agent not equal to i. For example, if i =1 ,t h e nx − i=x 2,a n d( R 0
i;R −i)
i st h es a m ea s( R 0
1;R 2).
We are interested in nding allocation rules that satisfy desirable prop-
erties not only in terms of incentives, but also in terms of eciency. An
allocation x 2 A is ecient with respect to a preference prole R 2R 2if
there exists no y 2 A such that for some i 2 N, yi Pi xi and y−i R−i x−i.W e
also call an allocation rule ecient if it assigns to every preference relation
an allocation that is ecient with respect to that preference relation.
For any prole R 2R 2 , denote the set of ecient allocations for R as
E(R). If both agents have the same preference relation (R1 = R2), then the
set of ecient allocations is the entire set: E(R)=A .I f R is such that
agent 1 values good 1 relatively more than agent 2 does, then the set of
ecient allocations is E(R)=E
y f x2A:x 2
1=0o rx 1
2=0 g .I n t h e
opposite, remaining case, E(R)=E
p f x2A:x 1
1=0o rx 2
2=0 g .
2.1 A Denition of Nonmanipulability
Our goal is to nd allocation rules that never aord agents the opportunity
to gain much. The diculty in formalizing this notion is to dene much, for
all possible preference relations.
Our approach will be to restrict attention to measures on the consumption
space.5 There are many ways to construct such measures of gains (and we
will address more of them in the Conclusion). A simple one is to consider
one of the two goods as a numeraire good, in terms of which gains can be
measured. Such a measure is especially appropriate when one of the goods is
to be interpreted as a medium of exchange (e.g., money). For the remainder,
we interpret good 1 as such a numeraire good.
Consider a situation in which an allocation rule ' prescribes for a given
preference prole, R 2R 2 , an allocation x = '(R). If agent i would not
manipulate the rule for small gains, then there exists some >0 such that
5Alternatively, one could measure gains from manipulation in terms of some utility







Figure 1: If agent i has no -improvement, then he can only obtain bundles
in the shaded area.
if for some R0
i 2R ,' i ( R 0
i ;R −i)=' i ( R )+( ;0), then agent i would not
manipulate the rule with that particular misrepresentation R0
i. With similar
reasoning, if for some R00
i 2R ,i ti snot the case that 'i(R00
i;R −i)P i' i(R)+
(;0), then agent i would not misreport R00
i . In Figure 1, agent 1 cannot gain
much at the prole R if, no matter how he misreports his preferences, the
bundle he receives lies in the shaded area.6
Formally, under an allocation rule ', agent i has an -improvement at
R 2R 2if there exists R0
i 2Rsuch that '(R0
i;R −i) P i ' i(R)+( ;0). We
say that ' provides truth-telling as -dominant if there exist no i 2 N and
R 2R 2such that agent i has an -improvement at R.
Of course as a special case, strategy-proofness is equivalent to providing
truth-telling as -dominant when  =0 .
3 A Bound on the Range
As shown by Schummer (1997) for this class of exchange economies with
linear preferences, the only rules that are both ecient and strategy-proof
are those that always allocate all of the endowment to a prespecied agent
(i.e., dictatorial rules). By relaxing the strategy-proofness condition to the
requirement that truth-telling be only -dominant, the class of admissible
allocation rules is enlarged, as we show further below in Example 1. Our rst
6In the language of Barber a and Peleg (1), his option set should lie within the shaded
area.
8result shows, however, that a prespecied agent always must receive nearly
all of the endowment of the numeraire good. On the other hand, allocation
of the second good may vary from being given entirely to the prespecied
agent to being given entirely to the other agent, as in Example 1.
Theorem 1 Let ' be an ecient rule that provides truth-telling as -
dominant, where <Ω 1= 5 . There exists an agent i 2 N that always receives
almost all of the numeraire good: for all R 2R 2,' 1
i( R )Ω 1−2  .
To prove the result, we rst provide the following lemma, which essentially
states that for all preference proles with the same set of ecient allocations,
the chosen allocations are not much dierent in terms of the numeraire good.
Lemma 1 Let ' be ecient and provide truth-telling as -dominant. For
all R;R0 2R 2, if either E(R)=E ( R 0)=E





Proof: Let R;R0 2R 2be such that E(R)=E ( R 0)=E
p.I ti se i t h e rt h e
case that E(R1;R 0
2)=E
p,o rE ( R 0
1 ;R 2)=E
p. Without loss of generality,
suppose E(R1;R 0
2)=E
p (which is true, for example, if the indierence curves
of R1 are \ﬂatter" than those of R0
1).
By eciency, '(R1;R 0
2) 2 E




p,w eh a v e' 1
























































proving the result. 
N o ww ec a np r o v et h et h e o r e m .
Proof of Theorem 1: Let ' be ecient and provide truth-telling as -
dominant. There are three possible cases.
Case 1: For all R 2R 2,i fE ( R )=E
p,t h e n' 2
1( R )=Ω 2.
Step 1a: (E
y) In this case, for all >0, there exists R 2R 2such that
E(R)=E
y and '1(R) = (Ω1;Ω2 − ). To see this, let R1 satisfy (0;Ω2) P1
(Ω1 + ;Ω2 − ), let R2 be such that E(R)=E




p. Since truth-telling is -dominant and E(R0
1;R 2)=E
p,
' 1( R )+( ;0) R1 '1(R
0
1;R 2)R 1 (0;Ω
2)
by the hypothesis of Case 1. Therefore '1(R) P1 (Ω1;Ω2−). Since '1(R) 2
E
y,w eh a v e' 1( R )=(Ω1;Ω2 − ).
Therefore by Lemma 1, for all R 2R 2 ,i fE ( R )=E
y,t h e n' 1
1 ( R )
Ω 1− 2  .
Step 1b: (E
p and A)L e tR2R 2be such that E(R) 2f E
p;Ag, and suppose
in contradiction to the theorem that Ω1 −'1
1(R)−2 = >0. Let y;y0;y00 2
E
y satisfy (see Figure 2):
y1 I1 '1(R)+( +=3;0)
y
0
1 I1 '1(R)+( +2 =3;0)
y
00
1 I1 '1(R)+( 2 +2 =3;0)
Let R0
2 be such that y2 I0
2 '2(R) − (;0). Since '(R1;R 0
2) 2 E
y,t h e
truth-telling condition implies '2(R1;R 0
2)=y 2.L e tR 00
2 be suciently ﬂat so
that both y00
2 P 00
2 (Ω1 +;0) and y0
2 +(;0) P 00



















Figure 2: Proof of Theorem 1. The gure represents the upper-right corner
of the Edgeworth Box.
Let R0
1 satisfy (0;Ω2) I0
1 y00
1 +( ;0). Then E(R0
1;R 00
2)=E
y.N o t e
that by construction, y0
1 +( ;0) I1 y00
1. The truth-telling condition implies
'1(R1;R 00






By the hypothesis of Case 1, for all R00
1 such that E(R00)=E
p,w eh a v e
' 1 ( R 00) = (0;Ω2). But then for any such R00




(;0), which contradicts the truth-telling condition.
Therefore, if Case 1 holds, we have derived the conclusion of the theorem.
Case 2: For all R 2R 2,i fE ( R )=E
y,t h e n' 2
2( R )=Ω 2.
This case is symmetric to Case 1. In this case, for all R 2R 2,' 1
2( R )
Ω 2−2  ,
Case 3: Neither Case 1 nor Case 2 holds, i.e., there exist R;R0 2R 2such
that E(R)=E
p,E ( R 0)=E
y,' 2
1( R )<Ω 2,a n d' 2
2( R )<Ω 2.
In this case, by Lemma 1, for all R;R0 2R 2,E ( R )=R
p implies '1
1(R) 
2,a n dE ( R 0)=R
y implies '1
2(R0)  2.S i n c e<Ω 1= 5, this implies that







Let R1 be such that (2;Ω2) P1 (Ω1 − 3;0). Let R2;R 0




y. Then eqn. (3) implies '1(R0
1;R 2) P 1
' 1(R)+( ;0), which contradicts the truth-telling condition. Therefore this







Figure 3: Constructing a non-dictatorial, ecient rule that provides truth-
telling as -dominant.
4 An Important Rule
Theorem 1 states that under an ecient rule that provides truth-telling as
-dominant, one agent always must receive at least Ω1 −2 of the numeraire
good. The rule described below in Example 1 shows that (i) this bound
is tight, and (ii) there is no such bound corresponding to the other (non-
numeraire) good. That is, Agent 1 receives (i) from as little as Ω1−2 of the
numeraire good to as much as all of it, and (ii) from as little as none of the
other good to as much as all of it.
Furthermore, and most importantly, this rule is unambiguously the \least
dictatorial" (or most equitable) of all ecient rules providing truth-telling
as -dominant. This statement is made more precise below as Theorem 2.
Example 1 Fix the allocations x = ((Ω1 − ;Ω2);(;0)), which gives
agent 1 the entire endowment except for  units of good 1, and x0 = ((Ω1 −
2;Ω2);(2;0)). For all R1 2R ,l e ty ( R 1 )2E
y be the unique allocation in
E
y that agent 1 considers indierently to x (as in Figure 3), i.e., x1 I1 y1(R1).
Then for all R 2R 2,l e t
~ ' ( R )=
(
x 0 if x0 is ecient for R
y(R1) otherwise
We leave it to the reader to check that ~ ' is ecient and provides truth-telling
12as -dominant.
This rule is clearly not symmetric. In fact, for most proles of preferences,
both agents would prefer Agent 1's consumption bundle to Agent 2's. A
more formal discussion of welfare appears in Section 5. The statement of
Theorem 1 does not, by itself, rule out more equitable rules. As the next
theorem shows, however, ~ ' is the most equitable ecient rule that provides
truth-telling as -dominant. Under any other such rule, say ',o n eo ft h et w o
agents|specically, the agent that does not always receive almost all of the
numeraire good|would prefer the bundle Agent 2' receives under ~ ' to what
this agent receives under ', regardless of the prole of preferences.
Theorem 2 The rule ~ ' is the most equitable ecient rule that provides
truth-telling as -dominant. Specically, let ' be an ecient rule that pro-
vides truth-telling as -dominant, where <Ω 1 = 5 . There exists an agent
i 2 N such that for all R 2R 2, ~ ' 2( R )R i' i( R ) .
Proof: Let ' beanecient rule that provides truth-telling as -dominant.
Suppose without loss of generality that Agent 1 always receives at least Ω1−2
of the numeraire good. We show that for all R 2R 2,~ ' 2 ( R ) R 2' 2 ( R ).
If E(R)=E
p, the conclusion follows from Theorem 1, since '2(R) 5
(2;0) = ~ '2(R).
If either E(R)=E
y or E(R)=A , suppose in contradiction to the theo-
rem that '2(R)  ~ '2(R). Then there exists >0 such that
'1(R) I1 (Ω





Letting y = '(R)a n dR 0
2=R 2, and dening y0, y00, R0
1,a n dR 00
1 as in Case 1,
Step 1b in the Proof of Theorem 1, leads to a contradiction as in that proof.

5 A Measure of Welfare
Theorem 2 provides a lower bound on the welfare of an agent under an
ecient rule providing truth-telling as -dominant. In order to have a better
13understanding of exactly how well-o Agent 2 is when using the rule ~ ',i ti s
useful to consider a class of normalized utility functions. We parameterize
each preference relation Ri 2Rwith i 2 ]0;1[ such that the preference
relation is represented by the utility function
u(xi)= ix
1
i+( 1− 1) x
2
i
We consider the case in which Ω = (1;1). Therefore an agent's utility is
always equal to one when receiving the entire endowment, and is equal to
zero when receiving nothing. In particular, a utility level can be interpreted
as a proportion of the entire endowment, that is, u(Ω1;Ω 2)= .
Under the rule ~ ', Agent 2's utility is a function of 1, 2,a n d .I ti sa






2  2 if 2  1
(1 − 2)(1)=(1 − 1)i f  2 < 1! 2= ( ! 2+ )
 2+! 2(1 − (2=1)) otherwise
Figure 4 shows the utility of Agent 2 when  =0 : 1. We see that Agent 2
receives a non-negligible amount of utility at many proles. The average util-
ity that Agent 2 receives over the entire range of values for (1; 2) is approx-
imately 0.18.8 This is signicantly higher than the average utility Agent 2
would receive from a constant  =0 : 1 units of the numeraire good, which
would be 0.05. By the previously mentioned result of Schummer (1997), if
strategy-proofness were required, one agent would receive a constant util-
ity of zero. These numbers encourage the idea that a \small" relaxation of
strategy-proofness leads in some sense to a \larger" relaxation of dictatorship.
7Proof available upon request.
8Values were calculated with Microsoft Excel for values of 1 and 2 ranging from 0.01




















Utility to Agent 2
Figure 4: Utility to Agent 2 from the rule ~ ',w h e n=0 : 1. Lambda i
increases with relative preference toward the numeraire good. (Note: to
facilitate viewing, the x-axis of this gure is reversed.)
156 The Truth-telling Condition as a Perturbation of
Strategy-proofness
To further emphasize the idea that a small relaxation in strategy-proofness
leads to a large increase in the ﬂexibility of rules, consider the implications
of the truth-telling condition (with eciency)a sapproaches zero. The rule
~ ' was dened in Example 3 with respect to a xed value of . The range of











As  converges to zero, this set converges to the right-hand border of the
Edgeworth Box: fx 2 A : x1
1 =Ω 1g .
Therefore, as the provision of truth-telling as -dominant converges to
strategy-proofness, the range of admissible rules does not converge to the
class of strategy-proof and ecient rules (i.e., dictatorial rules) characterized
in Schummer (1997).9 This discontinuity is important to observe because it
reinforces the notion that a small relaxation of strategy-proofness leads to
a relatively large increase in the number of admissible rules. On domains
for which impossibility results regarding strategy-proofness have been estab-
lished, relaxing the condition even in a small way may signicantly enlarge
the class of admissible allocation rules.
7 Other Rules and Other Domains
The rule ~ ' can be generalized to yield a larger class of ecient rules providing
truth-telling as -dominant. These rules, described in Example 2, are not
particularly elegant; they are essentially the same as the rule ~ ', except for
arbitrary -perturbations in a direction favoring Agent 1. Recall that by
Theorem 2, such perturbations cannot favor Agent 2.
We provide these rules not to suggest their use, but to suggest that a
9Formally, this sequence of examples shows that the ranges of the admissible rules is
a correspondence that is not upper-semi-continuous at  = 0. It is clearly lower-semi-









Figure 5: A more complicated, non-dictatorial, ecient rule that provides
truth-telling as -dominant. Given R1, if agent 2's preferences are steeper
than R1, choose a point in the horizontal shaded area. If agent 2's preferences
are ﬂatter than R0
2,c h o o s ey ( R 1 ). Otherwise, choose a point w(R)i nt h e
vertical shaded area.
characterization of rules satisfying the truth-telling condition (which we do
not provide) may be best attempted using an approximation approach.
Example 2 Fix the allocation x = ((Ω1 − ;Ω2);(;0)), and let y:R!
E
y be dened as in Example 1. Let :R2 ! [0;] be an arbitrary function.
For preference proles that have the ecient set E





that always satises w2(R) R2 x2. For all R 2R 2,l e t




x− ( R )i f x is ecient for R
y(R1)i f y 2 ( R 1 ) R 2 x +( ;0)
w(R) otherwise
If our class of economies is generalized to include three or more goods,
our rule ~ ' can be generalized in the natural way. Formally, alter the in-
terpretation of the notation of Example 1 so that Ω2 refers instead to the
(vector of) total endowment of all non-numeraire goods, and for all R 2R ,
17y(R1;R 2)2E(R) is any allocation (ecient for R) that Agent 1 considers
indierently to x. Then the redenition of ~ ' is well-dened, ecient, and
provides truth-telling as -dominant.
We conjecture that results analogous to Theorems 1 and 2 can be obtained
for the case of multiple goods. With an investment in additional notation,
such results should be obtainable in the same way Schummer (1997) extends
the results for 2-good economies to multiple-good economies.
Our rule ~ ' can also be generalized to the domain of economies in which
the two agents may have any (possibly non-linear) convex preference rela-
tion.10 Again using the notation from Example 1, the rule should let Agent 2
decide the nal allocation by choosing his favorite from among the alloca-
tions Agent 1 considers indierently to x. In the case that Agent 2 would
choose x, however, the rule should allocate x0.
8 Conclusion
We have introduced a relaxation of the notion of dominant strategy imple-
mentation by requiring only that truth-telling be an -dominant strategy.
This concept was formalized by dening an -improvement to be a misrep-
resentation that provides a gain equivalent to receiving an additional  units
of a prespecied numeraire good (which could be thought of as money).
On the simple class of 2-agent exchange economies with two goods, in
which agents have linear preference relations, we have provided (in Theo-
rem 1) a bound on the range of any ecient rule that provides truth-telling
as -dominant: A prespecied agent must always receive almost all of the nu-
meraire good; the second agent always receives at most 2 units of the good.
However, we provide a rule (in Example 1) which varies the allocation of the
second good between the two agents to the degree that in some situations,
one agent receives all of it, while in some other situations, the other agent
receives all of it.
The ﬂexibility of this rule is in stark contrast to the conclusions derived
when truth-telling is required to be a dominant strategy, i.e., that the only
10We omit a formalization of this common domain.
18strategy-proof, ecient rule in this context always allocates all of the goods
to a prespecied agent (Schummer (1997)). Admittedly, the rule provided
in Example 1 is not extremely ﬂexible. However, we show (in Theorem 2)
that this rule is actually the most equitable of all ecient rules that provide
truth-telling as -dominant.
To summarize, the negative interpretation of the results is that the re-
quirement that truth-telling be -dominant does restrict our choice of rules, at
least for this economic environment. This is not surprising given the previous
results concerning strategy-proofness. The positive interpretation of the re-
sults concerns the fact that even a small relaxation of strategy-proofness leads
to a relatively large increase in the ﬂexibility of rules. This is not only good
news for domains with previously established impossibility results regarding
strategy-proofness, but also for domains in which additional requirements,
such as eciency, may restrict our choice of reasonable allocation rules. The
results extend to broader classes of 2-agent exchange economies, as described
in Section 7.
There is an additional point that gives these results even more positive
ﬂavor. In models with additional agents, the rules satisfying the truth-telling
condition may be even more ﬂexible. The 2-bound of Theorem 1 crucially
depends on the fact that there are only two agents. Roughly speaking, two
unilateral changes in preferences change the welfare of agents by an amount
comparable to at most 2 units of the numeraire good (as in the proof of The-
orem 1). With more agents, there is reason to believe that changes in pref-
erences by more agents will lead to even greater ﬂexibility in rules satisfying
our condition.11 This provides hope that for other economic environments for
which impossibility results have been obtained regarding strategy-proofness,
there is reason to consider our weaker truth-telling condition.
11This could be seen as a dual result to the asymptotic results of Roberts and Postle-
waite (1976).
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